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In Pennsylvania as in many other states, employee pension 
costs are a significant source of financial pressure for school 
districts (Zeehandelaar and Northern 2013, Pennsylvania 
Public Employees’ Retirement Commission 2013).  In order to 
gain greater insight into the nature of Pennsylvania school 
districts’ financial burden related to pension commitments, 
this article presents the findings of two scenarios, one which 
compared the maximum amount of local property tax 
revenue Pennsylvania school districts could raise under a 2010 
state property tax limitation statute, Act 120,1 to their pension 
obligations; and a second scenario which incorporated a 1% 
annual salary increase into the analysis. The article is divided 
into three sections. The first provides the fiscal context for this 
study. This is followed by a description of the methodology 
used in the study and the presentation of findings. The third, 
and final, section presents conclusions.
The Fiscal Context for Pennsylvania School Districts 
In the years prior to the Great Recession of 2007-2009, 
state and local revenues in Pennsylvania were increasing 
moderately along with the economy while school district 
expenditures were increasing at relatively low and predictable 
rates. However, the national economic crisis brought about 
a new budget climate, one for which many Pennsylvania 
school district administrators and boards were largely 
unprepared, fiscally or attitudinally. State aid was slashed, 
and local revenues were limited or reduced by the downturn 
in the economy. Prior fiscal trends and historical operational 
processes offered little guidance with regard to how re-
establish and maintain fiscal stability. Districts were forced to 
make substantial changes in their fiscal and programmatic 
operations. In order to balance their budgets, Pennsylvania 
school districts had to make significant reductions in key 
expenditure areas such as instruction and operations.  
Even prior to the economic recession, Pennsylvania school 
districts were facing fiscal challenges as the result of Act 1, a 
state law enacted in 2006 which imposed local property tax 
limitations on school districts.2  Then, in 2010, shortly after 
William T. Hartman is Professor in the Educational Leadership 
Program in the College of Education at Pennsylvania State 
University where he teaches courses in school finance, school 
district budgeting, and financial modeling. His present research 
focuses on understanding the impact of the current economic 
crisis–the “new fiscal reality”–on school districts.
Timothy J. Shrom has served the past 32 years as Business 
Manager of the Solanco School District in Quarryville, 
Pennsylvania. He is a past President of the Pennsylvania 
Association of School Business Officials and a leading expert 
on school funding, health care, and innovative cost-saving 
practices in the state.
Local Property Tax Limitations vs. School District 
Employee Pension Costs in Pennsylvania
 
William T. Hartman and Timothy J. Shrom
1
Hartman and Shrom: Local Property Tax Limitations vs. School District Employee Pensi
Published by New Prairie Press, 2017
14 Vol. 41, No. 2, Spring 2014
the official end of the Great Recession, Act 120 dramatically 
increased school districts’ mandatory pension contributions. 
On the revenue side, there was a dramatic change in 
districts’ ability to control local taxes with the implementation 
of Act 1. Prior to its enactment, school boards could raise local 
property tax rates with a majority vote of the board. Under 
Act 1, school districts were limited in raising their tax rates 
to an inflationary index that was the average of the percent 
increase in the Pennsylvania statewide average weekly wage 
and the federal employment cost index for elementary and 
secondary schools. This rate was adjusted upward for less 
property-wealthy school districts, allowing them to raise their 
tax millage. Between 2007 and 2012, the base index fell from 
a high of 4.4% in 2009 to a low of 1.4% in 2012, while the 
average adjusted index fell from a high of 5.7% in 2009 to a 
low of 1.8% in 2012. (See Table 1.)
Property taxes are the major revenue source under the 
control of the local school boards in Pennsylvania. In 2012, 
they made up 79% of all local revenues collected and 46% 
of total revenues received by districts in Pennsylvania. By 
contrast, state aid to school districts represented 36% of 
school district revenue although the state aid share per 
district varied from 10% to 78% depending upon the school 
district’s property wealth (Pennsylvania Department to 
Education n.d.a). Consequently, constraints on property tax 
rates increases can affect a school district’s ability to balance 
its budget.
The fiscal condition of Pennsylvania’s public school 
employees’ pension system is like that of many other states 
in that it has large unfunded pension liabilities (Pennsylvania 
Public Employees’ Retirement Board 2013).3  Over several 
decades, the obligations to current and future recipients have 
been substantially underfunded, forcing a massive catch-up 
effort (Pennsylvania Office of the Budget 2012). A combination 
of economic conditions and political decisions led to the 
need for large increases in state and district payments into 
the pension fund (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 2012). 
In 2010, Act 120 re-amortized the unfunded liabilities and 
established controlled, but sharply increasing district required 
contribution levels rising to over 30% of salaries by 2019 
and continuing at that level through 2035 (Public School 
Employees’ Retirement Board 2013).
District pension contributions are calculated in terms of an 
employer contribution rate, which represents a percentage 
of district employee salaries. Each year, school districts make 
a mandated payment into the PSERS fund based on this 
required rate. The most recent employer contribution rates for 
PSERS and the annual and cumulative percentage increases 
they represent are shown in Table 2. Beginning in 2012, the 
rates started a steep annual climb to reach 29.15% by 2018. 
Annual percentage increases began at 53% in 2012, but will 
decline to 3% by 2018. However, cumulatively, districts will 
see a 417% increase in their mandated pension contributions 
between 2011 and 2018. 
For most districts, the state share of this expenditure is 
approximately 50%, so while the percentage increases to 
districts will be the same as shown in Table 2, the dollar 
amount is shared with the state. The district’s pension 
contribution has to be covered local property tax revenues, 
other local revenues, and other state subsidies. District 
Table 1  |  Base Index and Adjusted Indices:  2007-2015
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Base Index (%) 3.9 3.4 4.4 4.1 2.9 1.4 1.7 1.7 2.1
Adjusted Index (%)
Minimum (%) 3.9 3.4 4.4 4.1 2.9 1.4 1.7 1.7 2.1
Average (%) 5.0 4.4 5.7 5.3 3.8 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.7
Maximum (%) 6.3 5.5 7.1 6.7 4.7 2.3 2.8 2.8 3.4
Table 2  |  PSERS Employer Contribution Rates for Mandatory District Pension Payments as a Percentage of  
      District Employee Salaries: 2011-2018
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
PSERS Employee  
Contribution Rate (%) 5.64 8.65 12.36 16.93 21.31 25.80 28.30 29.15
Annual Increase (%) 53 43 37 26 21 10 3
Cumulative Increase (%) 53 119 200 278 357 402 417
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pension contributions range from $295.8 million in 2011 
to $1.57 billion in 2018. (See Table 3.) Practically speaking, 
pension costs act as a prior obligation in the school district 
budgeting process; that is, before other components of the 
budget can be considered, districts must budget for pension 
costs. 
Methodology
The purpose of this study was to compare the property 
tax revenue that districts could raise using their maximum 
allowable Act 1 property tax rates to their state-mandated 
pension costs. Then, the analysis was extended to include 
the impact of an annual 1% increase in district salaries. The 
school district was the unit of analysis, and the time period 
for the study was 2011-2018. The data source for 2011 and 
2012 district revenues and expenditures was the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education. These data were also used as a basis 
to develop projections for 2013 through 2018. 
Three district data sets were compiled for each year of 
this study: (1) Maximum local property taxes that districts 
could raise under the state property tax limitation; (2) 
Mandated district pension obligations; and (3) District salary 
expenditures with an annual 1% salary increase. The analysis 
first focused on comparing allowable annual increases in 
property tax revenues against annual pension costs faced by 
the districts, and then it focused on the impact of pension 
costs plus and an annual one percent increase in salaries.   
The maximum increase in local property taxes that a 
school board is allowed to levy is established by the annual 
inflationary index of Act 1. As shown in Table 1, the base index 
was 1.7% in 2013 and 2014, and it is set to rise to 2.1% for 
2015. For relatively property-poor school districts, an adjusted 
index, which increases their allowable index, is calculated by 
the Pennsylvania Department of Education. Consequently, 
the average adjusted index across all districts is higher: 
2.2% in 2013 and 2014, and 2.7% in 2015. The Pennsylvania 
Independent Fiscal Office (IFO) has projected base indices 
between 2.3% and 2.4% out to 2017 (Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania 2012). Future estimated adjusted  indices were 
calculated for each district using the IFO future estimates 
of the base Act 1 indices for each future year and applying 
the Pennsylvania Department of Education formula for 
adjustments for poorer districts.   
The data source for 2010-2012 current and interim property 
taxes collected by school districts was the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education. For 2013-2018, the authors 
estimated the annual maximum  property tax revenue by 
increasing the prior year’s amount by the district’s adjusted 
index times the prior year’s amount. The difference between 
the new total property tax amount and the prior year’s 
amount was the maximum increase in property tax allowable 
for the district. These calculations set an upper bound on the 
increase in property taxes available to districts. However, not 
all school boards choose to increase taxes to the maximum 
level. In practice, only half of the districts raised their property 
taxes to the maximum in 2012 in spite of the state revenue 
shortfall.  
The calculations for the annual expenditure increases for 
pension commitments and salaries followed a similar process. 
The data source for 2010-2012 salaries was the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education. Future annual salary increases were 
estimated at 0.5% for 2013 and 1.0% for the remaining years. 
PSERS rates for the years of the study were shown in Table 
2. Annual calculations were made for each district’s net dollar 
pension cost by multiplying the total salary amount by the 
PSERS rate and then halving it. The annual cost increase for 
pensions was determined by subtracting one year’s cost for 
pensions from the prior year.  
Finally, for each year, the PSERS net dollar increase to 
districts was subtracted from the maximum allowable increase 
of property taxes to compare the two amounts. Districts with 
a negative balance had a larger increase in pension costs for 
that year than the school board’s authority to raise property 
taxes. Districts that had larger increases in property tax 
revenues than pension cost increases had a positive balance; 
that is, some property tax revenues remained for use in other 
areas of the budget. The annual number of districts in each 
category was then determined.  In addition to an annual 
analysis, a cumulative analysis was conducted.
Findings 
Figure 1 shows the number of districts with positive and 
negative balances after subtracting pension obligations, 
even after the school district levied the maximum allowable 
property tax rate. The numbers of negative and positive 
districts show a changing pattern over the eight years 
of the study. In 2011, approximately 85% of districts had 
positive balances. However, between 2012 and 2014, the 
percentage of school districts with negative balances grew 
steadily, from 41% to 68%, as the maximum property tax 
rate increase allowed declined from 3.8% to 2.2%. At the 
same time, pension contribution rates rose from 5.64% to 
16.93% of salaries. The percentage of districts with negative 
balances peaked in 2014, and, from that point forward, the 
pattern was projected to reverse with the number of districts 
with negative balances falling to zero in 2018. Even though 
pension contribution rates were projected to rise during this 
Table 3  |  Total School District Payments for  
    Pension Contributions:  2011-2018
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period from 21.3% to 29.2%, the number of negative-balance 
districts dropped steadily due to lower annual and cumulative 
increases in the contribution rates, low salary increases, and 
higher allowable property tax rates. Nevertheless, as late as 
2016, more than one-third (38.7%) of school districts were 
projected to have negative balances after meeting pension 
obligations.
Next, a cumulative analysis was conducted to examine the 
effects of property tax revenues and pension costs over time. 
(See Figure 2.) Although only 15.4% of districts had negative 
balances in 2011, the percentage more than doubled to 34.3% 
in 2015, but then declined to 21.4% in 2018. Even though the 
cumulative effects of property tax increases are projected 
to reduce the number of districts with negative balances 
between 2015 and 2018, they are insufficient to move 
approximately 20% of school districts to a positive balance. 
The previous analyses held district salaries constant. This 
scenario added the effect of an annual 1% salary increase. (See 
Figure 3.) The percentage of school districts with negative 
balances initially dropped by more than half between 2011 
and 2012, from 43.9% to 19.2%. However, the percentage 
of districts with negative balances then skyrocketed to 
Figure 1  |  Annual Number of School Districts with Positive and Negative Balances after Subtracting  
























Figure 2  |  Cumulative Number of School Districts with Positive and Negative Balances after Subtracting  
































Figure 3  |  Effect of Annual One Percent Salary Increase on the Number of School Districts with Positive  
























99.2% in 2015; that is, 495 out of 499 school districts had 
negative balances. The trend then reversed with only 46 
school districts, or 9.2%, with negative balances in 2018. The 
introduction of even a modest  salary increase clearly made 
the pattern of districts with negative and positive balances 
much more volatile.  
Figure 4 illustrates the cumulative effect of the addition 
of an annual 1% salary increase. The effect, in general, was 
less volatile, but, ultimately, it resulted in a negative balance 
for more than one-third (33.9%) of school districts. Initially, 
the percentage of districts with negative balances dropped 
sharply from 43.9% in 2011 to 20.9% in 2012. However, the 
percentage of districts with negative balances then rose to a 
high of 41.9% in 2016 before falling a few percentage points 
to 33.9% in 2018.
Conclusions
As the results of this study indicated, a number of 
Pennsylvania school districts face a volatile financial future 
as a result of recently enacted state laws related to property 
tax limitations and pension commitments. Even if these 
districts annually raise their local property tax rates to the 
state-allowed maximum for each of the next five years, the 
revenues will be insufficient to fund their mandated pension 
contributions and still provide employees with a 1% annual 
salary increase. Under these conditions, in order to balance 
their budgets, these districts would have to: (1) use their fund 
balance, if they have one (a short term tactic); (2) reduce and/
or eliminate programs and services; or (3) reduce personnel 
expenditures, e.g., through attrition or furloughs. Also, it 
should be noted that  even districts with positive balances 
may still have insufficient revenues to address the remainder 
of their budgeted expenditures. 
In order for districts to balance their budgets, revenues 
must be increased or expenditures must be reduced. On the 
revenue side, both property-poor districts and property-
wealthy districts are constrained. Property-wealthy school 
districts rely primarily on local property taxes as their major 
source of revenue. This source is limited to small annual 
increases in the base index for the next five years.  On the 
other hand, property-poor districts receive the bulk of their 
revenue from state subsidies. However, given recent history, 
substantial increases in state funding are unlikely.4  
Consequently, reduction in expenditures is the only 
feasible approach for districts to balance their budgets. Of 
the two expenditures used in this analysis–pension costs 
and salary increases–districts have no flexibility with regard 
pension payments since they are mandated by state law. 
The only source of relief is through legislative action. Several 
modifications to the current PSERS funding approach have 
been proposed, but none has gained sufficient support for 
approval by the legislature.
Salaries, on the other hand, are an expenditure over which 
districts have some control or influence. Actions that districts 
can take to reduce payroll costs include reducing the number 
of employees through attrition or layoffs, or engaging in 
collective bargaining for salary concessions or lower salary 
levels. There is some evidence that this happened in 2012 
following significant reductions in state funding.5 The fiscal 
effects of these actions was evident in the latest available 
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actual salary data in 2011-2012, where there was a 3% 
reduction in salary expenditures over the prior year. This was 
a result of both the reduction in personnel and other salary 
actions, such as wage freezes by a number of districts. 
This study considered only two of the critical expenditure 
areas that school districts have to fund in order to maintain 
their operations. For those districts facing negative balances 
after making mandated pension contributions or pension 
contributions plus a modest salary increase for staff, there are 
no funds available for other areas of the budget, even those 
that are mandated or essential to maintain. These include, 
but are not limited to, mandated tuition payments to charter 
schools,6 special education costs,7 and health care benefit 
costs. 
As each of these major expenditure areas is considered and 
added to the budget requirements, it becomes increasingly 
difficult for districts to balance their budgets. Looking at the 
budget equation, there are serious difficulties on each side. 
School district revenues are restricted or growing slowly due 
to a continued weak economy. Many critical expenditures 
are growing rapidly; significant ones are mandated by the 
state or federal governments and are out of district control. 
Other desirable, but not mandated, expenditures must be 
reduced. This has already led to painful, controversial budget 
reductions in staffing and programs in Pennsylvania. Given the 
projections of a likely continuing structural imbalance over 
the next five years, districts face the critical budget-balancing 
task of fulfilling all their financial obligations and maintaining 




1  P.L. 1269, H.B. 2497, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/
legis/li/uconsCheck.cfm?yr=2010&sessInd=0&act=120.   
2  Act 1 of 2006, Special Session 1, P.L. 1873, No. 1.
3  The Pennsylvania Public School Employees’ Retirement 
System (PSERS) is a guaranteed benefits system in 
which school districts and the state have equal funding 
responsibility. The state funds its portion of PSERS costs 
through a subsidy to school districts. 
4  State general aid revenues were cut by approximately $900 
million in 2012 followed by small increases of 0.9% in 2013 
and 2.3% in 2014, leaving districts more than $600 million 
below what they received in 2011.  
5  In a survey by two state administrator organizations, districts 
identified reductions of approximately 20,000 positions over 
a two year period, 2011-2012 and 2012-2013, in order to 
balance their budgets (Pennsylvania Association of School 
Business Officials (PASBO) and Pennsylvania Association of 
School Administrators (PASA), “School District Cost Cutting 
Continues for a Second Consecutive Year,” News Release 
(October 2012), http://www.bpsd.org/Downloads/2012PASBO
FundingSurvey.pdf.
6  Pennsylvania school districts are required to fund 100% of 
tuition payments to charter schools. The state subsidy to offset 
approximately 25% of these costs was terminated in 2012.  
7  State subsidies to school districts for special education have 
not increased since 2008.
Figure 4  |  Cumulative Effect of Annual One Percent Salary Increase on the Number of School Districts with 
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